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Chapter 10
Developments in European Pension 
Regulation: Risks and Challenges
Stefan Lundbergh, Ruben Laros, and Laura Rebel
This chapter focuses on developments in the regulatory frameworks for pensions 
in Europe, and their potential consequences for pension systems in the European 
Union (E.U.) and possibly other countries as well. Our aim is to outline how these 
changes in regulatory frameworks may develop, given the underlying demograph-
ical and societal trends. Because the rules are still under development, we focus on 
the key principles involved, rather than specific details.
In what follows, we first discuss retirement systems in the E.U. and how 
employment-based pensions are organized. Then we outline how the regulatory 
environment is changing. Next we explore the impact of the global financial crisis 
on the regulatory framework by highlighting specific experiences of the member 
states who were early adopters of the stricter regulatory framework. A final section 
concludes.
Retirement Systems in the European Union
Retirement systems in Europe are often described as having a three pillar struc-
ture, where Pillar I refers to the public pension, Pillar II refers to workplace (occu-
pational) retirement plans, and Pillar III consists of private savings through fiscal 
incentives.
In the E.U. region, the public pension is the foundation of retirement provision, 
though it is organized in many different ways across member states. Generally, pub-
lic pensions are redistributive, providing a minimum pension intended to minimize 
old-age poverty. Most of these are unfunded and paid for out of government budgets. 
As a consequence, projected low economic growth rates combined with retirements 
in the baby boomer cohort are placing the systems under pressure. In response to 
these pressures, many member states have proposed (or passed) laws raising retire-
ment ages to 67.1 Some countries responded with different types of reforms while 
others did little to counter these demographic changes. In any event, Pillar I is the 
bedrock on which the workplace-based retirement plans, Pillar II, rest.
Workplace-based retirement plans are intended to complement public pen-
sions by adding another layer of stable income after retirement. In other words, in 
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the E.U., occupational pensions have traditionally been seen as a tool for income 
smoothing over the lifecycle. During their productive years, workers save part 
of their wage to provide for an income in retirement. These pension savings are 
invested in financial markets, with the goal to maintain retirees’ purchasing 
power as long as they live (primarily aiming to provide compensation for infla-
tion). This could also be achieved by offering guaranteed real deferred annuity, 
as it could provide lifelong inflation-linked benefits, but this product is currently 
unavailable in the E.U. marketplace. Instead, traditional defined benefit (DB) 
pension schemes seek to fill the gap with something close to real deferred annui-
ties. In these plans, financial market risk, inflation risk, and longevity risk have 
traditionally been borne by the plan sponsor. But recent developments in longev-
ity and financial market volatility have rendered the DB model unattractive for 
many sponsors. As a consequence, the European market has witnessed both a 
rapid decline in DB plans and the rise of various forms of defined contribution 
(DC) plans over time.
Pillar III of the retirement system in Europe consists of individual saving 
through tax incentives which typically defer income taxes until after retirement. 
Though the initial objective was to encourage people to build up additional retire-
ment assets, over time many countries have lowered such tax deferrals.
Generally speaking in the E.U., governments provide the first pillar, whereas 
Pillars II and III are managed by pension funds, insurance companies, banks, 
and investment houses. In some cases, there is some overlap between the institu-
tions offering both second and third-pillar pensions. For example, in Sweden, 
insurance companies and banks offer the same kind of products in both pil-
lars, while in the Netherlands the second pillar is dominated by pension funds 
while the third pillar is dominated by insurance companies and banks. With 
the demise of traditional DB plans, one might expect providers of second and 
third-pillar retirement accounts to become less differentiated. The regulatory 
frameworks are also aligned along these lines. That is, DB pension plans oper-
ate under Pillar II and are covered by the regulation regarding Institutions for 
Occupational Retirement Provision (IORP), while insurance companies oper-
ating under both Pillars II and III are covered by Solvency regulation. The 
European Commission is currently developing what are known as IORP II and 
Solvency II rules, yet it is clear that the regulatory frameworks are converging. 
An important factor in the proposed regulation is the further extension of a 
risk-capital-based framework.
These changes are taking place within the frameworks promulgated by the 
Basel Committee on Bank Supervision covering banking regulation, which 
moved banks away from a capital-based regulatory framework and toward a 
risk-capital-based framework.2 In a risk-capital-based framework market, consist-
ent (i.e. arbitrage-free) valuation of the balance sheet is instrumental. It requires 
that the financial institution has large enough capital buffers (i.e. risk capital)
that the probability of becoming insolvent in the future is sufficiently low should 
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adverse movements in the financial markets occur. The minimum required size 
of the risk capital is a function of the risks on the balance sheet. The pensions and 
insurance industries are the last of the financial institutions to have moved toward 
a similar European framework. The proposed regulatory frameworks on occu-
pational retirement provision in the E.U. are mainly driven by harmonization, 
transparency, and customer protection.
It should be noted that the current problems in the European pension market 
such as low funding ratios and unsustainability of some types of pension systems 
are not attributable to the regulations; rather, the risk-capital-based approach 
only highlights the underlying problems of demographic changes. Yet the global 
financial crisis and ongoing problems with the euro provide a unique opportunity 
to assess how retirement systems in the member states have fared, especially in 
the case of member states that can be seen as early adopters of the new regulation. 
Going forward, it is reasonable to assume that there will be a further consolidation 
of the products, vehicles, and providers in both the second and third pillars, and 
that the regulatory frameworks will continue to converge (albeit over many years).
To date, the retirement provision industry has responded by moving toward 
pension solutions that do not embody guarantees. As a result, financial market 
and longevity risk are devolving to individual workers and retirees. We argue in 
what follows that both regulators and consumers will in turn demand increased 
transparency and fairness within group risk pools. If the providers of collective 
risk pools cannot meet these demands it is likely that low-cost individual DC sav-
ing schemes will emerge as the dominant form of workplace retirement provision.
Employer-sponsored Pensions in the  
European Union
Retirement systems do differ across the member states, which can be explained 
by differences in historical and cultural backgrounds. Nevertheless, all the E.U. 
nations face long-term aging, driving the need for reforms. While DB plans were 
the predominant form of workplace-based pensions in the past, they are being 
replaced by various forms of DC plans.
Across the E.U., companies traditionally elected one of three formats for DB 
plans: book reserve schemes, pension funds, or insured plans. In a book reserve 
scheme, the sponsor keeps future pension payments on its balance sheet as 
deferred salary. This is an unfunded solution deemed quite cost efficient, since 
there is no charge for asset management or taxes levied on capital gains. Yet this 
model requires some sort of insurance in the event of a corporate bankruptcy, as 
the employee might risk losing all pension rights. While book reserve schemes 
are less common than they were in the past, examples remain in Germany and 
Sweden. In a pension fund, the employer and the employees both pay contribu-
tions to a fund that is legally separated from the plan sponsor. This is called a 
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funded solution, but one where the sponsor holds the tail risk in the form of a 
covenant (to be discussed in more detail further on in the chapter). In the case of 
sponsor bankruptcy, a fully funded pension represents a secure solution since pen-
sion capital is maintained at arm’s length. A deeply underfunded pension would 
actually closely resemble a book reserve scheme, and it requires some sort of bank-
ruptcy protection for the members. In the case of an insured plan, an employer 
will pay pension contributions to a third party that takes over the responsibility 
to provide retirement income security to the workers. The third party is typically 
an insurance company, whose shareholders provide the risk capital backing the 
guarantees. This third solution has attracted strict regulation to protect the inter-
ests of the clients in case of insurer bankruptcy.
In the past, many E.U. workers relied on DB schemes for most of the funded 
retirement component, and only high earners had an individual top-up in the 
form of an individual DC. Offering DC schemes was an attractive option for 
both sponsoring companies and financial service providers, and it appeared 
attractive to the employees during the equity bull market in the 1980s and 90s. 
While traditional DB schemes based on final wage and inflation indexation 
worked very well for many years, they were best suited for different times. The 
DB pension formula was simple to understand as it depended only on years in 
service and final salary. In Europe, most DB pensions also provided lifelong 
inflation-linked benefits.
Of late, several economic and social trends have made the traditional DB 
design even less sustainable. These include increasing longevity, low fertility, 
worker mobility, and shorter service at an employer. For instance, in the E.U. 
average life expectancy at birth was close to the retirement age after World War 
II, but has risen to around 77.7 years and is likely to rise further.3 The average life 
expectancy at 65 for both sexes averages 17.3 years in the E.U. and is projected 
to rise by another 3.4 years up to 2045 (OECD 2012). Moreover, in the E.U. the 
average woman gives birth to her first child later in life and has fewer children. 
With average fertility rates now around 1.5, virtually all E.U. member states will 
experience a declining population without immigration (OECD 2012). To these 
changes must be added the fact that today’s workers are more mobile than in the 
past. Rather than remaining in a single occupation or industry, many will change 
employers multiple times, and some will have periods of self-employment and 
international mobility. Accordingly, a corporate-backed pension plan at a single 
employer is often not the preferred vehicle for retirement provision in the current 
labor market.
As we cannot select a single pension model representative of what is going 
on across all member states, we instead focus our study on three—Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—in detail. All three at one time had a pen-
sion system characterized by traditional DB pension schemes, and all three have 
changed their pension systems, albeit in different directions. Additionally, each 
country was an early adopter of a stricter regulatory framework for its workplace 
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retirement system, applying to both pension funds and insurance companies. We 
discuss each in turn.
Sweden
While many Nordic countries have implemented retirement system reforms, 
Sweden is of particular interest since its first pillar is income-dependent and the 
second pillar is mainly serviced by insurance companies. From an international 
perspective, Sweden is quite unusual and is frequently studied by other member 
states that are considering reforms. In the 1990s, it became clear that the Swedish 
pension system was not sustainable and that there was a looming retirement crisis 
with the Baby Boomers retiring. All political parties joined to reach an agreement 
without making retirement provision an election issue. The main reform was to 
change all the pension products in the different pillars to DC schemes, since nei-
ther the government nor employers offer guarantees anymore.4
The first-pillar retirement provision was changed in the late 1990s into a 
so-called Notional DC pension system, separate from the government budget but 
governed by Parliament and managed by a governmental agency. The system 
is partly funded, with a balance sheet where the notional pension rights of indi-
viduals represent the liabilities and future pension contributions and buffer funds 
represent the asset side. The buffer funds act, as the name suggests, as a means 
of dealing with the demographic bulge due to the Baby Boomers. What makes 
the system sustainable is the presence of an automatic ‘break’ that, when needed, 
will return the balance sheet to parity by reducing liabilities—including pensions 
in payment. As part of the pension reform, an individual DC component was 
also introduced to the first pillar, called the premium pension. Initially individu-
als had to choose from among 800+ funds, a development critiqued by Sunstein 
and Thaler (2008) as an example of complex choice architecture. In 2011, almost 
all (98.5 percent) of youth entering the labor market ended up investing in the 
‘default’ choice (Swedish Government 2013). A typical employee pays 23 percent 
in pension premiums on top of salary: 16.0 percentage points go into the Notional 
DC system, 2.5 percentage points into the premium pension, and the remaining 
4.5 percentage points into occupational retirement provision. There is a cap on 
the salary level that is covered by the public pension system and the premiums 
paid above that cap are transferred to the state budget and are to be considered 
as an additional tax. For employees earning more than that cap, additional pen-
sion premiums go into the occupational retirement provision through a collective 
agreement to compensate for this implicit tax. In 2011, 19 percent of men and 
7 percent of women had incomes above the cap (Swedish Pensions Agency 2012). 
The tax incentives for the third pillar are relatively limited.
The Swedish government continues to review the system, with a commit-
tee currently examining the pension age. The Swedish Pensions Agency (2012) 
has calculated what pension age would be required to maintain current pension 
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incomes, which may indicate what these reforms might look like. The social part-
ners (employer organization and unions) are relatively strong in Sweden, and there 
are national collective agreements regulating occupational retirement provision. 
Historically, self-annuitizing mutual insurance companies have dominated occu-
pational retirement provision offering a guaranteed product called ‘traditional 
life’ which, in spirit, is quite similar to traditional DB plans. Corporate pension 
funds are rather uncommon. What is interesting to note is that the social partners 
manage the procurement process where the individual employee selects his/her 
provider via an election platform. The employees choose mainly between tradi-
tional life products and individual DC platforms, both offered through a limited 
set of providers. The default choice is typically a traditional life product provided 
by a self-annuitizing mutual insurance company controlled by the social partners.
The Netherlands
Many cite the Dutch retirement system as a strong one due to its fully funded 
quasi-mandatory Pillar II pension funds. The Netherlands is also interesting since 
the traditional DB models have been evolving into hybrid schemes over time, 
sometimes described as ‘collective DC’ schemes. This process began, as in many 
other countries, in the wake of the tech bubble crisis. The terms and conditions of 
the DB pension deal changed by moving from final wage and full inflation indexa-
tion to career average and conditional indexation. This change illustrates the con-
sensus culture wherein the social partners, on behalf of their members, can agree 
on changes at the negotiation table.
In the Netherlands, Pillar I  is a pay-as-you-go program financed from the 
annual budget; benefits are based on the number of years retirees have lived in the 
country. Singles receive 70 percent of the minimum wage ($1,337 per month) and 
couples together receive 100 percent of the minimum wage; this makes the ben-
efits among the lowest first-pillar benefits in the E.U. (along with the U.K.) (OECD 
2011). The government has already boosted the retirement age, slated to reach 
age 67 in 2023, and it will be linked to longevity increases from 2024 onward 
(SVB 2013). The first pillar is financed through taxes. For income up to $43,500 
(2013 figures) the employee pays 17.9 percent of pay into the first pillar.5 Over the 
full income (minus a deduction for the first pillar) an employee pays a percent-
age of his income into the second pillar. On average, 17.4 percent of pay goes to 
the second pillar, although the largest three pension funds all levied a premium 
above 25 percent in 2013 (DNB 2012b). The maximum tax levy for third-pillar 
retirement provisions is relatively small. Overall, the average Dutch employee 
pays approximately 20 percent of his/her income into all three pillars and it is a 
widely accepted notion among Dutch people that they work one day a week for 
their pension.
The fact that Pillar I benefits are low makes the Pillar II benefits more impor-
tant. There are three types of pension fund in the Netherlands:  industry-wide 
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funds (which have 88 percent of the participants and 73 percent of the assets 
managed), corporate pension funds, and pension funds for a certain occupation 
(although the latter are rare and relatively small). A clear trend in the Netherlands 
is that corporations are terminating their own pension funds; since 2000, the 
number of corporate pension funds has fallen by 63 percent (DNB 2013). They 
either join an industry-wide plan or opt for an insured solution. Recently a third 
alternative was introduced, namely the PPI, a Dutch IORP vehicle, which is a way 
to offer DC pensions without guarantees.
The average Dutch worker receives approximately 40 percent of the total pen-
sion income from the first pillar, 50 percent from the second pillar, and 10 percent 
from the third pillar. The social partners (employer organization and unions) still 
have a strong position in the Netherlands and they negotiate national collective 
agreements which include second-pillar pensions. Participation is not mandated 
by law but rather imposed by social partners in collective agreements. The details 
of the second-pillar provision can be negotiated for an entire industry, where every 
employer in an industry will be obliged to join the industry-wide pension scheme 
and their employees obliged to save for their pension through their employer. 
There is also a growing group of self-employed, often in low-income jobs, outside 
the collective system; they must rely on buying individual products in the third 
pillar. There is also discussion underway as to whether guarantees should be pro-
vided in Pillar II plans, and what the maximum tax-favored contribution should 
be. In the end, Pillar II is also expected to migrate toward a DC model.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has transformed its pension system in a different direc-
tion from that of the two countries just discussed. Because the U.K. focuses more 
on enabling individuals to make choices, individual DC schemes have become 
the dominant pension provision. Part of the difference is that individual fairness 
is seen to be more important than collective benefits. From a legal perspective, 
the U.K. has a contract-based legal system (common law), making it difficult to 
change pension contracts retroactively, even if they prove to be unbalanced.
The U.K. Pillar I is financed from the state budget, and it consists of two parts. 
The Basic State Pension is a flat-rate amount and provides a pension of $121 per 
week on average (PPI 2010).6 The second part, called the State Second Pension, 
is means-tested. For an average person, it ranges from $27 to $50 per week (PPI 
2010).7 The government introduced an extensive rehaul of the first pillar which 
will go into effect in 2017. A flat-rate system will replace the means-testing and the 
overall pension income in the first pillar will be $219 per week ($11,800 per year) 
plus inflation rises between now and 2017.8 Additionally, the U.K. will raise the 
retirement age from 65 to 67 over a 13-year period (U.K. Government 2013).
In the past, most British workers participated in company DB plans providing 
a decent retirement income. Currently few private sector workers have open and 
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accruing DB plans, while public sector employees are in DB schemes. Most pub-
lic employees are in unfunded book reserve schemes, with the exception of those 
working for the local governments, but those plans are in relatively poor financial 
condition. Recently the government introduced an auto-enrolment reform, which 
forces all firms to offer workplace pensions where individual employees may still 
opt out. Contribution rates for the auto-enrolment pensions are relatively low 
compared to the Netherlands: the minimum is 8 percent of salary (3 percent is 
contributed by the employer, 4 percent by the employee, and 1 percent through 
tax relief; DWP 2012). At retirement, workers use all or part of their pension sav-
ings to buy an annuity. The government has also set up NEST, a low-cost pension 
scheme that must accept all employers that want to become clients. In doing so, 
the government hopes that almost everyone will build up Pillar II pensions in 
the future. But even with these reforms, contribution levels remain low, which 
will translate into meager retirement incomes for the low earners. In addition, 
pension costs and fees are rather high, which can erode future retirement income 
(Pitt-Watson 2012). Nearly all Pillar II pension plans open to new private sector 
employees in the U.K. are DC (see Table 10.1).
Table 10.1 Overview of first and second pillar for Sweden, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom
Sweden The Netherlands The United Kingdom
First pillar Large Small Small
Notional DC
Income-dependent, 
but with a minimum 
pension level.
A small part of the 
income-dependent 
public pension is 
individual DC.
Pay-as-you-go
Flat minimum level
Pay-as-you-go
One part is flat minimum 
level
Second part is 
means-tested, but will 
become flat level.
Second 
pillar
Small Large Small
Social partners model with 
collective agreements.
Election centrals operated 
by social partners, 
where the employee 
selects pension product 
and provider. Default 
choices are typically 
low-cost mutual 
insurance companies.
Market liberal 
implementation
Social partners model with 
collective agreements.
Quasi-mandatory 
Industry-wide pension 
fund operated by social 
partners.
Paternalistic 
implementation offering 
limited individual 
employee choices.
Employer must offer 
occupation retirement, 
but employee can opt 
out.
Employee has choices 
within the solution of 
the pension provider.
Market liberal 
implementation
Source: Authors’ compilations.
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To summarize, in many E.U. nations, as demonstrated here, traditional DB 
plans are no longer existing occupational retirement solutions and they are rap-
idly being replaced by various DC arrangements, especially for new employees. 
The demise of the traditional DB is attributable to the fact that their design was 
unsustainable given demographic and societal trends, and because the sponsors 
did not manage the tail risks well. One should not blame the passing of DB plans 
on new regulation.
Longer-term Trends in the E.U. Regulatory 
Environment
Europe has a long history of conflict, and the creation of a single market through 
the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, 
and later the European Union, was meant to pave the way for economic synergy 
and political stability. One important aspect of the move toward a single mar-
ket has been to seek consistent legislation across the different member states. For 
financial markets, a number of European-wide frameworks have been developed. 
Of course these reforms do not take place overnight, and changing European 
regulation is a highly political process with many vested interests. As with most 
regulatory processes, it also tends to be reactive and moves forward in response to 
crises or scandals.
Pension regulation currently under development in the E.U. is the result of an 
evolutionary process driven by harmonization efforts among member states. It 
aims to create a single market for European retirement provision. One complica-
tion is that the vehicles providing pension products are subject to different sets of 
regulations. For insurance companies the Solvency directive exists, while pension 
funds are subject to the IORP directive. Additionally, there is a gap between regu-
latory solvency measures and economic solvency measures in both the regulatory 
regimes.
The proposed regulatory frameworks (Solvency II for insurance companies 
and IORP II for pension funds) use the market valuation of the balance sheet to 
close the regulatory gap. This will incentivize insurers and pension funds to man-
age their balance sheet risk in a more economically meaningful way. The new 
regulation will also provide supervisors with an early warning system as well as a 
set of meaningful tools to bring about changes when needed.
As said, insurance companies are currently subject to the European prudential 
framework called Solvency; changes and improvements to this framework will 
result in the implementation of Solvency II. Similarly, pension funds in Europe 
are subject to the IORP directive, and several changes to the IORP directive will 
mean the future rollout of IORP II. The banking sector is ahead when it comes 
to European regulation. Their regulation is called Basel and Basel II is already 
implemented. When comparing Basel II to IORP II and Solvency II, similarities 
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arise. All three regulatory frameworks operate on a three-pillar model. The first 
pillar concerns quantitative capital requirements in order to minimize the risk 
of insolvency of the financial institution. The second pillar sets standards for risk 
management and governance within a financial institution. It also allows national 
supervisors to challenge the institutions on the conducted risk management. The 
third pillar imposes standards for transparency toward supervisors and the pub-
lic. In Basel I, IORP I, and Solvency I, the focus was mostly on the quantitative 
rules. The term ‘three-pillar model’ is not to be confused with the three pillars that 
are used for the distinction between public pensions, occupational pensions, and 
individual pensions. To minimize confusion below, we reserve the term ‘pillar’ for 
the distinction between public, occupational, and private retirement provision.
Solvency: European Insurance Regulation
European solvency rules for insurance companies have been in place since 1973, 
when the European insurance legislation took form. Over the years, the rules 
evolved while the basis remained the same: insurance companies were obliged to 
hold a minimum amount of regulatory capital to insure against unforeseen events. 
A revision of the rules in the 1990s resulted in the implementation of the Solvency 
I directive in 2002. Since then, the regulation has again been reviewed and a new 
expected Solvency II directive is intended to be implemented in 2014. It is very 
unlikely, however, that this timetable will hold, so implementation is likely to start 
in 2015 or 2016 (Nyman 2012).
After a series of unexpected bankruptcies in the insurance industry in Europe, 
European policymakers realized that the prudential rules of Solvency I do not 
capture all the risks on the balance sheets of insurance companies. Due to the 
importance of insurance companies to the financial stability of a country, some 
member states reacted as early adopters by introducing national legislation that 
was stricter than just Solvency I, while at the same time the European Parliament 
pondered the question of how Solvency I should be improved.
IORP: European Pension Fund Regulation
Before the IORP I directive was introduced, a single market for European pen-
sions did not exist. Due to differences in fiscal regimes and social and labor jurisdic-
tions, a pan-European fund was (almost) impossible to set up. This was a practical 
challenge for many multinationals in Europe. A larger problem was that the lack 
of a single market caused fractured pension accumulation, which was an obstacle 
to labor force mobility between member states. In addition, due to the reduction 
of first-pillar pension benefits throughout Europe, second-pillar pension provision 
grew in terms of relative importance of the total retirement provision. On June 3, 
2003, the European Parliament and the European Council introduced the IORP 
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I directive (E.U. 2003). The IORP I directive provides a prudential framework for 
pension funds in which it creates a minimum level of prudential supervision for all 
member states. As it serves as a minimum level of supervision, all member states 
adopted IORP in their national regulation and some implemented more restric-
tive prudential rules.
Some member states recognized the potential to become a haven for 
pan-European pension funds and were quick to erect new pension vehicles that 
can facilitate pension schemes from different member states. Most notably, 
Belgium and Luxembourg created vehicles that could be used by, for example, 
multinationals to pool pension schemes from different member states. Some mem-
ber states already had vehicles in place that adhered to the IORP directive, such as 
the Netherlands and Ireland, but not all vehicles were suitably equipped to service 
foreign schemes. Belgium actively promoted their IORP vehicle, called the OFP, 
with the argument that they would apply the minimum level of prudential super-
vision as the unique selling point. In 2005, Belgium even released a leaflet called 
‘Belgium, prime location for pan-European pension funds’ in which the Prime 
Minister of that time, Yves Leterme, promoted Belgium as an attractive domicile 
(Federal Public Service Finance 2008). In June 2012, EIOPA reported 84 cases of 
IORPs facilitating foreign schemes. Half of these cases are held between Ireland 
and the United Kingdom (EIOPA 2012).
Similarities and Differences between IORP II and 
Solvency II
IORP II and Solvency II build on the foundations of their predecessors, and as 
such, they share similar goals. Solvency I and IORP I provided insurance compa-
nies and pension funds with a European passport permitting them to service pen-
sion plans from other member states. In addition, regulators seek to take another 
step in creating a single European market and to strengthen the financial institu-
tions providing second and third-pillar pensions. The general approach of the 
frameworks is similar; both use an economic risk-based solvency model applied to 
all member states to avoid regulatory arbitrage between the member states.
An important source of discussion, however, is the underlying vehicle supplying 
the pension. In the early design stages of IORP II, it appeared as if its risk-based 
capital approach would be the same as the one in Solvency II. Nevertheless, the 
pension fund industry resisted this change as it would increase required risk 
capital. Their main argument was that pension funds and insurance companies 
have different risk-absorbing potential. The sponsor covenant backing many 
pension funds implies that the sponsor company will pay a higher premium or 
lump sum payment if the pension fund falls into financial distress, which could 
give them more leeway with regard to required risk capital. This may be true in 
some cases, but many sponsors lack the financial strength to fill the gap, in which 
case the value of the covenant is relatively small. But in some cases, such as the 
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Netherlands, accrued benefits can be reduced when a pension fund’s funding ratio 
is low, whereas this is not the case for insurance companies.
Responding to pension fund critiques, the European regulator came up with 
an extended approach for pension funds termed the Holistic Balance Sheet 
approach. This represents an integral approach to a pension fund’s balance 
sheet, valuing various recovery methods including the reduction of pension rights 
and indexation, as well as the backing of a protection fund. But this idea too has 
come under criticism due to the complexity of valuing some of the instruments in 
a market-based valuation framework. As yet, European Commission has post-
poned the implementation of the first pillar of the IORP directive, which focuses 
on capital requirements, arguing that the solvency rules should be ‘an improve-
ment, rather than a punishment’ (IPE 2013).
The discussion around Solvency II and IORP II has raised attention to proper 
risk management, providing a general yet simple framework for financial institu-
tions to use. These institutions can also develop their own more thorough risk 
management systems, which then must be approved by the regulator. The pro-
posed regulation has also provided impetus to speed up consolidation in the pen-
sion market. The increased capital requirements make it advantageous to have 
different activities under one roof, due to diversification effects in the calculation 
of the capital requirements. Also, the regulation is likely to raise administration 
costs and governance costs, making it less attractive to run a small pension fund or 
insurance company.
Other Drivers of European Reforms
The observed convergence between previously quite differentiated industries such 
as banking, insurance, and pensions has also helped drive the need for regula-
tory reforms in the E.U. Current regulation allows pension providers to undertake 
regulatory arbitrage by managing their regulatory risk instead of the actual eco-
nomic risk. In times of financial crisis with sharply falling interest rates, regulatory 
frameworks based on fixed actuarial rates allow the pension provider to maintain 
a risky investment strategy, whereas applying a market-consistent (risk-neutral) 
valuation of liabilities could show that the pension provider is technically under-
funded or even bankrupt. It is anticipated that future regulation will better meas-
ure and regulate these institutions’ economic risks to improve customer/member 
protection and the financial stability of the pension providers. Moreover, it is 
hoped that increased transparency will provide regulators with an early warning 
system as well as a framework in which meaningful tools for preventive interven-
tions can be deployed.
This is of particular importance since governments have a moral obligation to 
handle the consequences if regulation and enforcement are inadequate. Roberts 
(2012) describes the Equitable Life debacle in the United Kingdom, which 
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represents an example where the U.K. government eventually shouldered some 
responsibility for those who lost their pension rights. Reducing the regulatory 
gaps will lower the chances of unexpected and large bankruptcies, but it will also 
induce management to manage the economic risk and not issue off-balance sheet 
guarantees.
Collective Risk Pool Regulation
The idea of collective pooling of risk has long been the foundation of group pen-
sion provision, based on the notion that individuals can pool their individual lon-
gevity risk with a large group of other similar individuals. Insurance companies 
or pension plans can then offer lifetime annuities by carefully managing those 
risks that are not significantly diminished by pooling; remaining open-ended risks 
must be absorbed by the plan sponsor in DB pensions, the collective in mutual 
insurance companies, or shareholders in stock insurance companies. The goal of 
regulation in these cases is to provide some degree of certainty that the institu-
tions can honor their promises on an ongoing basis. By contrast, persons holding 
individual pension accounts bear both longevity and capital market risk on their 
personal balance sheets; the capital in their accounts is ring-fenced, so most of 
the new regulatory reforms do not impact individual DC pension systems. This 
explains the rapid growth of individual pension solutions offered by banks, insur-
ance companies, and pension schemes.
Both the Solvency II and IORP II proposed regulations prescribe that risk 
management and governance of the financial institutions they speak to must be 
proportional to the scale, nature, and complexity of the operations. Moreover, 
they set out requirements for these groups’ level of expertise, internal audit, and 
outsourcing. But they do not prescribe the quality of the financial product from 
the consumer’s perspective. When a ‘hard’ promise is provided, enough risk-based 
capital is required to absorb shocks; when a product has a ‘softer’ promise (an 
ambition or aspiration), the vehicle is responsible only for implementation risks, 
while the rest of the risks remain with the client/member. An important side effect 
of the regulatory reform debate is that it has offered a methodology for determin-
ing fairness between different cohorts (or individual members) inside collective 
risk pools. By applying risk-neutral pricing and valuation mechanisms, members 
can still benefit from collective risk-sharing and gain clarity over their individual 
claims in a mark-to-market framework (Kocken 2012).
In many E.U. mandatory occupational retirement provision schemes, inter-
generational risk-sharing typically translates into applying intertemporal smooth-
ing of asset returns, so as to dampen the impact of financial market volatility on 
pension income. The length of the smoothing period determines the degree of 
intergenerational risk-sharing taking place. A challenge is that risks with a trend, 
such as systemic longevity risk, can give rise to one-way intergenerational trans-
fers. While intergenerational risk-sharing can be welfare-enhancing in some 
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circumstances, this is a different case which is probably not welfare-improving.9 
And intergenerational risk-sharing may not be appealing for occupational pen-
sions, especially when participation in a specific collective risk pool is not man-
datory. For example, proposed changes to the Dutch pension system are clearly 
moving away from intergenerational risk-sharing by applying a relatively short 
smoothing window (a maximum of ten  years; Rijksoverheid 2012). This was 
proposed to provide some fairness between generations and stability in pension 
income for those who have already retired.10
Due to the fact that pensions are moving increasingly to DC plans, and the 
products offered by pension funds, banks, and insurers are becoming more simi-
lar over time, it may be less necessary to continue regulating pensions and insur-
ance companies differently in the future. Nevertheless, sensible regulation must 
consider features distinctive to pension products, such as whether guarantees are 
offered, collective risk pools or individual accounts, trust-based or contract-based 
governance, payouts in retirement, and mutual or stock ownership of pension 
vehicles. The conventional European DB scheme was provided by a mutual vehi-
cle and was a self-annuitizing collective risk pool with a guarantee provided by the 
plan sponsor. There are still mutual insurance companies in Sweden which offer 
very similar products, with the difference that the guarantee is provided by the 
collective instead of the employer. By contrast, individual DC products typically 
lack guarantees and need to be converted to an annuity at retirement.
Solvency II and IORP II regulatory proposals do not seek to alter the gov-
ernance structures of collective risk pools. But with pensions moving away from 
‘hard guarantees,’ their governance structures become even more important. 
Individual products are often associated with contract-based governance: that is, 
the employer selects a provider of the DC scheme (traditionally an insurance com-
pany) on behalf of its employees, and employees participate in the plan by entering 
into a contract directly with the provider. A danger of contract-based governance 
is that there might be no entity acting in a role similar to that of a trustee. In other 
words, trust-based governance has a fiduciary duty to help participants save the 
best way possible, but contract-based governance need not—and sometimes can-
not—help participants due to possible legal consequences.
Regulations Regarding Pension Accounting and 
Solvency Requirements
In the past, the European pension and insurance industries were heavily regulated 
and required to invest mostly in national government bonds. Post-deregulation, 
the industry was able to invest more freely and on the asset side, and valuations 
changed from book to market value. The introduction of market valuation of assets 
in the past resolved some adverse behavioral effects that book valuation method-
ology had had on sound investment principles. In order to protect the solvency, 
pension funds and insurance companies tended to keep their underperforming 
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investments when the market price was below acquisition cost to avoid realizing 
losses, and sold their successful investments to enhance solvency. Sometimes ‘air’ 
built up on the asset side of the balance sheet, so the introduction of market valu-
ation of assets was quite painful for certain pension funds and insurance compa-
nies. Nowadays, pension and insurance liabilities may still be reported at book 
value. Not surprisingly, discussions about moving to market valuation of the liabil-
ity side are again raising concerns.
We have not discussed changes in international accounting standards yet, 
though they are pertinent to E.U. regulatory reforms. The international account-
ing standards expressed in IAS19/FRS17 stipulate that a corporation must report 
its pension liabilities in its balance sheet, as per the 2005 revision of international 
accounting standards (IFRS). One consequence was that traditional DB schemes 
began to close to new members when their unfunded liabilities had to be reported 
on the sponsor’s balance sheets.
A Look at Solvency and IORP
The current regulatory frameworks, Solvency I and IORP I, could be described 
as capital-based accounting frameworks. The original E.U. directive on Solvency 
was ratified in 1973, and the E.U. directive for Institutions for Occupational 
Retirement Provision came in 2003 (E.U. 2003). The longer history of Solvency 
shows in the details of the regulation. For example, IORP I set no limits on a 
pension fund’s asset classes, as long as the ‘prudent person principle’ is upheld 
(meaning that investments made on a client’s behalf should be made in a prudent 
manner). This involves no quantitative restrictions other than prohibiting holding 
more than 5 percent in its underlying sponsor (and 10 percent in shares belonging 
to the same group as the sponsor). By contrast, Solvency I further restricts insur-
ers’ permissible asset classes (E.U. 2002), to stimulate diversification. For example, 
insurers cannot invest more than 10 percent of their gross technical provisions in 
one piece of real estate, 10 percent of the shares in non-regulated markets, 3 per-
cent in cash, or 5 percent of the shares in one undertaking. IORP I, more than 
Solvency I, serves as a minimum basis on top of which member states can imple-
ment their national prudential framework.
Neither Solvency I  nor IORP I  prescribed risk management procedures. 
Rather, the prudential rules were based on the expected long-term mean of the 
distribution and did not include the (very relevant) short-term tail risk. This is 
expressed by the freedom that member states have in determining discount rates 
used for liabilities. As said, the proposed Solvency II and IORP II frameworks are 
moving toward a mark-to-market valuation of the balance sheet and a risk-based 
supervisory framework.
Several conceptual challenges arise when thinking of moving to market valua-
tion for liabilities. Using book values for liabilities means that only asset volatility 
influences solvency; therefore opting for a stable return on the asset side is the 
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rational thing to do. Yet it is conceptually problematic to evaluate cash flows using 
different methods depending on whether they are on the asset or liability side of 
the balance sheet. The market valuation approach for liabilities makes it impos-
sible to have both a stable solvency ratio and stable asset returns, since the liability 
side is sensitive to changes in interest rates. This has a large impact on how pension 
funds and insurance companies must manage the asset side of the balance sheet.
In our view, using book value for liabilities can make it difficult to prudently 
manage economic solvency risk, since the official solvency measure does not rep-
resent actual economic risk. As a consequence, the current regulatory solvency 
measure, in combination with the equity bull market until 2000, obscured the 
impact of falling interest rates. Conversely, when market rates dropped below the 
discount rate, problems became much more apparent.
An Illustrative Example
The effects of the impact of changes in interest rates, equity prices, and longev-
ity for a pension balance sheet using different valuation methods are illustrated 
in Table 10.2 for a stylized Dutch corporate DB pension fund having a mature 
collective risk pool. At the beginning of 2007, its initial asset mix was set at half 
equities (MSCI World) and half fixed income with a duration of six years (equal 
to the duration of Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index for Europe). The dura-
tion of the liability side was 15 years. We assume that, prior to 2007, the fund used 
an actuarial discount rate of 4 percent leading to a (nominal) regulatory solvency 
ratio of 135 percent, approximately the average in the Netherlands at the time.
At the beginning of 2007,usage of the actuarial discount rate was discontinued 
and the regulator forced the fund to adopt a market valuation approach. The tim-
ing of the implementation was favorable, since then the valuation gap between 
regulatory solvency and economic solvency was positive. The market funding ratio 
was slightly higher than the previous regulatory funding ratio since swap rates 
exceeded the fixed actuarial discount rate of 4 percent. This stylized DB pension 
fund had two significant market exposures: equity risk and a duration mismatch. 
The stylized pension fund was also exposed to changes in longevity. Sensitivity of 
Table 10.2 Sensitivity analysis for a stylized DB pension scheme at January 1, 2007
Solvency based on market 
valuation of liabilities (%)
Solvency based on book 
valuation of liabilities (%)
Starting point 139 135
1% point decline in interest rates 124 139
10% falling equity prices 132 128
1-year increase in longevity 136 132
Source: Authors’ compilations.
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the solvency to shocks in yields, equity prices, and longevity increases is illustrated 
under market and book valuation of liabilities.
As we can see, the regulation in place creates perverse incentives that conflict 
with sound risk management principles. To reduce the regulatory solvency risk, 
the DB pension fund could reduce the duration of its fixed income assets, but, as 
a consequence, economic solvency risk will actually increase. With a fixed actu-
arial discount rate, the balance sheet volatility only depends on the volatility of 
the asset portfolio, and senior management is therefore evaluated on its ability to 
create high and stable returns on the assets. Falling interest rates since the 1970s 
and booming equity markets until 2000 made the ‘asset-only balance sheet’ appear 
strong, but this was an illusion. And the existing regulatory framework also made 
it a challenge for the organization to manage both the economic solvency risk and 
the business/reputational risks at the same time. This conflict of interest is similar 
to that leading to the collapse of many financial institutions in the global financial 
crisis: a regulatory framework which allowed for off-balance sheet risk-taking and 
stock investors demanding higher ROEs produced a downward spiral where sound 
management of the real economic risk in the financial institution was actively pun-
ished and generated excessive leverage. This conflict of interest was accentuated by 
Chuck Prince, the Citigroup CEO, in 2007 when he famously told Financial Times 
(2007): ‘. . . as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.’
The sensitivity results in Table 10.2 illustrate that book valuation of liabilities 
encourages asset portfolio strategies that had an expected negative impact on the 
economic balance sheet. In essence, the traditional DB pension fund borrowed 
money from its members at the long end of the yield curve by issuing long-dated 
promises. It then invested the contributions at the short end of the curve. A popu-
lar hedge fund investment strategy is the so-called ‘carry trade,’ where an investor 
borrows at the short end of the curve to invest at the long end of the curve. During 
normal cases, when the yield curve is upward-sloping, this can be a profitable 
strategy in expectation. By contrast, pension funds and insurers had systematic 
exposure to the exact opposite situation, a ‘negative carry trade.’ This trade is only 
profitable when the yield curve shifts upwards enough that the decline in net valu-
ation is larger than the yield pick-up, but this strategy loses money when the yield 
curve is stable or falling.
This example shows that the current DB pension fund crisis is an unfortunate 
consequence of long-term trends that were disguised by problematic regulation 
in combination with poor risk management. These insights are not new, and the 
E.U. commission worked for years on new regulatory frameworks to better align 
the regulatory and economic risks. In our view, the new regulatory frameworks 
are probably best described as risk-based accounting frameworks aimed at reduc-
ing the gap between the regulatory measure and the real economic risk.
Some E.U. member states have introduced stricter national regulations, in 
anticipation of the proposed E.U. regulation. To illustrate what the early adopters 
have done, we turn again to Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.
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Sweden
In 2006, Sweden introduced market valuation for liabilities using the Swedish 
yield curve as the market rate (previously various other methods were used). 
The Swedish FSA (Finansinspektionen) introduced the so-called traffic light sys-
tem, where a company’s solvency risk is categorized as green, amber, or red. 
When a company is moving from yellow to red, the Swedish FSA has a set of 
pre-determined actions that will take place, with the final action being the closure 
of an insurer or pension fund. Since there are few pension funds in Sweden, simi-
lar rules applied to both. Moreover, the Swedish financial minister has suggested 
that there will soon be one framework for both pensions and insurers. Yet many 
insurers and pensions have not changed their risk management practices to date, 
instead continuing with the business model and investment strategy from the old 
regulatory regime.
Netherlands
Market valuation of liabilities was introduced in the Netherlands in 2007, using 
a yield curve based on interbank swap rates provided by the regulator, the Dutch 
Central Bank (DNB). Before that, an actuarial discount rate of 4 percent was used. 
While pensions and insurers face similar regulatory frameworks, there are some 
details with large consequence. The chance of underfunding of a pension fund can 
only be 2.5 percent, while an insurer can only have a 0.5 percent chance of under-
funding. The Dutch Central Bank introduced the FTK (Financial Assessment 
Framework) for pension funds, which is similar to the Swedish traffic light system. 
FTK set two thresholds for nominal solvency of (approximately) 105 percent and 
125 percent requiring regulatory actions (Pensioenfederatie 2012). Pension funds 
may remain below 105 percent for a maximum of three years but they must submit 
a recovery plan to the supervisor, including raising contributions and, ultimately, 
reduction of pension payments. Those who do not comply may be closed. Some 
pension funds did change their business models and applied sound risk manage-
ment principles, though many have not.
The United Kingdom
The Pension Act of 2004 initiated a move toward market valuation of liabilities for the 
DB schemes, along with a minimum funding requirement and the installation of a 
Pension Regulator and Pension Protection Fund. Trustees of a DB scheme are respon-
sible for a prudent valuation of the liabilities, for which they have to seek professional 
advice. A specific interest rate is not prescribed, unlike in Sweden and the Netherlands. 
In practice, most DB pension schemes use a discount rate of gilts (U.K. inflation-linked 
bonds) plus x percentage points, where x typically ranges between 0.5 percent and 
1.5 percent. When setting the discount rate, several factors are taken into account, 
such as plan demographics, current asset values, and the sponsor’s strength. In case 
204 Recreating Sustainable Retirement
of underfunding, a recovery plan is required by the pension regulator where remedial 
actions must be outlined. The insurance industry was quite early in moving toward 
market valuation of liabilities in anticipation of a stricter regulation.
Ongoing Debate
Member states continue to debate the correct market discount rate for pension 
liabilities. There is no market for the liabilities in corporate retirement plans, 
and some recommend that the selected yield curve should be without credit risk 
and based on liquid instruments to avoid valuation distortions. The pension and 
insurance industry frequently propose that a smoothed yield curve, for example 
using the average yields over the previous five-year period, would be better to use, 
since that would eliminate short-term fluctuations in the yield. Walschots and van 
Capelleveen (2009) argue that, from an economic perspective, using smoothed 
returns causes refinance returns to be incorrectly evaluated. Especially for long 
smoothing periods, the true economic return only becomes apparent after a long 
time, when it might be too late to take corrective actions.
The proposed risk-based accounting framework is disruptive for the traditional 
pension funds and insurance contracts providing guarantees, so it is not surprising 
that governments are being lobbied to try to weaken the impacts of these proposed 
regulatory changes. Opponents to market-based valuation argue that it is too sen-
sitive to short-term volatility, and that book value better represents the true value 
of the liabilities. But, given recent market experiences, in our view a market valua-
tion approach for both assets and liabilities better represents the quality of the bal-
ance sheet. Pensions or insurers paying out on the hope that markets will recover 
during downturns might end up in bankruptcy, if the adverse scenario is persistent 
enough and economic risks are not managed in prudent way.
Regulations Regarding Fair Treatment of 
Customers/Members
While traditional DB plans historically sought to pay a stable income in retire-
ment, most DC plans do not put an emphasis on the pay-out phase. As the transi-
tion toward non-guaranteed retirement payouts continues, with the risks pushed 
to individuals, regulation becomes even more important to protect individuals’ 
interests. The E.U. regulation seeks to ensure fair treatment for consumers, with 
greater transparency as well. The IORP and Solvency regulations prescribe 
minimum information that must be provided to participants; this includes an 
annual report, the target level of retirement benefits, the level of benefits in case 
of cessation of employment, the participants’ capital market risk exposure, and 
arrangements relating to the transfer of pension rights to another institution for 
second-pillar pension provision (E.U. 2003: Article 11).
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Yet this required information serves only as a minimum, and some member 
states have additional requirements. For example, second-pillar Netherlands 
members receive an annual statement called the Uniform Pension Overview 
(UPO) that is, as the name implies, uniform. This makes sure that all partici-
pants receive the same level of information, although many pension funds have 
a broader communication platform than just the UPO. Continuing the stronger 
focus on protecting the consumer, Sweden and the Netherlands have banned 
commission-driven independent financial advisors. The United Kingdom has 
introduced a Retail Distribution Review (RDR) and Treat Customers Fairly 
(TCF) policies which focus on restoring trust in the financial system.
The Global Financial Crisis: A Stress Test of the  
E.U. Regulatory and Supervisory Reforms
Next we ask how European pensions and insurers fared during the global finan-
cial crisis, since this period served as a stress test of the regulatory framework, as 
well as of the political willingness of the E.U. member states to stick to the prin-
ciples when their local financial industry is struggling. Since the crisis started in 
2007, equity markets in the E.U. have been very volatile, and interest rates have 
fallen to historically low levels. It is unclear how long these low interest rates will 
persist, since structural economic problems will take time to address.
To illustrate how the financial crisis affected these industries of interest, it is 
useful to recall the hypothetical Dutch scheme from Table 10.2. We focus on 
the six-year period January 1, 2007–January 1, 2013, which includes the global 
financial crisis as well as the euro crisis, and we expose this pension fund to these 
developments as well as longevity improvements. First we assume that the fund 
made the strategic decision to stick to its investment strategy, keeping its asset mix 
constant by annual rebalancing to the 50/50 asset mix, and not hedging the dura-
tion risk. During this period, the 30-year euro swap rate dropped from just above 
4 percent to approximately 3 percent, and the MSCI World had a negative return 
in euros of 12.9 percent. Average life expectancy also rose by 0.8 years during this 
period.11
Table 10.3 indicates how the individual effects affected solvency (for clarity we 
have not attributed the cross effects and thus the impact of the individual effects 
does not add up to the total impact). The optical illusion due to book valuation can 
readily be seen. If the regulatory framework continued to use the actuarial dis-
count rate (i.e. that used for the book value of liabilities), the global financial crisis 
and the euro crisis would have had little impact on the pension fund’s solvency. 
Actually, with a fixed actuarial discount rate, the falling interest rates seemed to 
compensate for the decline in equity markets. Hence the pension fund seemed to 
be in strong financial shape during this difficult period.
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But the fund’s problems become very clear after applying market valuations to 
the liabilities: using the solvency criterion of 103 percent, the pension fund is almost 
insolvent. The investment strategy of a static asset mix was exposed to both falling 
interest rates and falling equity markets; these combined with increased longevity 
eroded solvency by 36 percentage points over a six-year period. Under the pro-
posed market valuation framework, management’s investment strategy wiped out 
most of the fund’s risk capital. This very simple example illustrates how following a 
regulatory framework based on an actuarial discount rate can provide a false sense 
of security. In fact, the Netherlands was an early adopter of market-based liability 
valuation and some funds managed their solvency risk successfully.
Corporate Sponsor Risk
Not only did the crisis hurt DB plan solvency; it also hurt the sponsor’s profit-
ability as well. And if the current economic scenario continues for another five 
to ten years, some closed DB plans may not be able to maintain their guarantees. 
Kocken and Potters (2009) showed that the financial status is quite path depend-
ent for aging pension funds following a traditional static 50/50 asset mix. Should 
real asset returns be poor during the plan’s early years, and the pension payment 
be large, the fund’s economic solvency might eventually be depleted. Conversely, 
if real returns early on are strong, solvency is likely to persist.
Transition Problems
When moving from the old to the new regulatory regime, there may also be tran-
sition problems. For instance, DB schemes that did not carefully manage their 
economic solvency risk could drag their sponsors down with them, if the pro-
posed regulation were introduced and enforced at current low interest rate levels. 
E.U. policymakers must then decide whether to require the stricter regulatory 
framework to better protect retirees’ accrued rights, versus risking losing jobs 
Table 10.3 Impact on solvency due to markets and longevity developments between 
January 1, 2007, and January 1, 2013
Solvency based on market 
valuation of liabilities (%)
Solvency based on book 
valuation of liabilities (%)
Solvency at January 1, 2007 139 139
Solvency at January 1, 2013 103 135
Change in Solvency 
(percentage point)
−36 +0
due to interest rates 111 (−28) 146 (+11)
due to equity 130 (−9) 126 (−9)
due to longevity 137 (−2) 133 (−2)
Source: Authors’ compilations.
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today. Policy regarding the insurance industry faces a similar conundrum, since 
a stricter regulatory framework may better protect customers, while at the same 
time threatening the survival of the local insurance industry.
Again, it is of interest to analyze how the early adopters of a stricter local regula-
tory framework fared during the crisis. In many cases, local regulators were strict 
in enforcing their local regulatory frameworks, since most pensions and insurers 
had decent balance sheets entering the crisis period. The collapse in risky asset 
values did hurt initially but markets rebounded, and so there was limited impact 
on the economic balance sheet. Falling interest rates, on the other hand, had a 
huge impact on the economic balance sheet of pensions that implicitly (or explicitly) 
speculated, following the negative carry strategy on their economic balance sheet.
Sweden
As a result of the crisis, many mutual and stock insurers stopped selling their tradi-
tional life products. Most of this occurred on a voluntary basis, though some were 
forced to close by the Swedish regulator due to insufficient solvency.
The Netherlands
In early 2013, the Netherlands experienced the bankruptcy of an insurer, SNS 
Reeal, after which the company was nationalized. Dutch pension funds with 
a solvency level below 105 are being forced to reduce their liabilities by cutting 
real pension rights for both active and retired members. Benefits cuts have been 
announced at approximately 70 pension funds, to be implemented in 2014; this 
will affect more than two million active participants, 1.1 million retirees, and 
2.5 million deferred members. In 2011, the Dutch regulator also found that the 
metal workers’ pension trustees (PME) had taken excessive investment risks, and 
forced a change in trustees and investment policy.
The United Kingdom
In the U.K., the Pension Regulator effectively put several sponsor companies into 
bankruptcy and the Pension Protection Fund took over their DB liabilities. There 
are no prescribed discount rates in this case, so the pension regulator has substan-
tial freedom to act. Nevertheless, the Pension Regulator has permitted lengthen-
ing of proposed recovery periods and more optimistic assumptions on expected 
returns, in some cases.
Easing of the Rules
The regulators in some of the early adopter member states decided to ease the 
rules due to the low interest rates in mid-2012. They announced that the low 
interest levels were exceptional and took measures such as introducing a 
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temporary floor on the yield curve in Sweden or temporarily introducing the 
Ultimate Forward Rate (UFR) in the Netherlands. In June 2012, when the inter-
est rate level hit an all-time low, some Swedish insurers that did not manage their 
economic solvency risk were on the brink of either becoming insolvent or having 
to sell their remaining risky assets at a large scale. In Sweden, insurers were then 
given the choice to apply either a temporary interest rate floor or actual mar-
ket rates. Those who opted for the temporary floor faced some restrictions on 
dividend payouts to shareholders (Finansinpektion 2012). Recently, the Swedish 
FSA announced that it will move toward an UFR methodology as described in 
Solvency II (Finansinspektion 2013).
More on the Ultimate Forward Rate
The UFR is a weighting scheme blending market rates and an assumed 
steady-state long-term interest rate (like an actuarial discount rate). Market rates 
are used for the part of the swap curve that is liquid, set at 20 years. Beyond that 
last point of liquidity (in the literature this point is referred to as the LLP, ‘Last 
Liquid Point’), the forward (UFR) interest rate is a weighted average of the last 
liquid forward rate (year 19 into year 20) and the UFR of 4.2 percent so that the 
forward rate converges to 4.2 percent in ten years (the Smith–Wilson 20-30 UFR 
methodology; EIOPA 2010).
It is worth mentioning that the Dutch regulator adopted a slightly different 
UFR methodology for pension funds where the last liquid market forward rate is 
not used; instead, a weighted average of the market forward rates and the UFR of 
4.2 percent is used during the convergence period. Furthermore the convergence 
period is ten years instead of ten years, so that the forward rate equals 4.2 percent 
at the 60-year point (DNB 2012a). Table 10.4 shows that solvency based on the 
two UFR methodologies is higher than the solvency based on market rates, since 
the UFR rate of 4.2 percent currently exceeds market rates. Yet the discrepancy 
between the economic solvency and the regulatory solvency concepts is much less 
striking than when a fixed discount rate of 4 percent is used (see Table 10.3). The 
number 4.2 percent is a bit arbitrary since it is based on ‘expert opinions’ for the 
Table 10.4 Impact on solvency due to UFR methodology, January 1, 2013
Solvency based on 
market valuation of 
liabilities (%)
Solvency based on 
Smith-Wilson 20-30 
UFR methodology 
(%)
Solvency based 
on Dutch UFR 
methodology for 
pension funds (%)
Solvency at January 
1, 2013
103 108 106
Source: Authors’ compilations.
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long-term real rate (2.2 percent) and inflation (2 percent); it is unclear how easy it 
will be to change the UFR rate in the future.
From a policy perspective, the introduction of the UFR methodology is of 
particular interest since it represents a step back toward applying a book valu-
ation methodology for the long end of the yield curve. This re-introduces a gap 
between the regulatory solvency risk and the economic solvency risk, the gap 
that the regulatory reforms sought to close in the first place. The regulatory 
gap introduced by the UFR methodology causes a dilemma for managers of a 
pension fund or insurance company. Should they be street-smart and manage 
the regulatory solvency risk, hoping for the best, or should they be prudent 
and manage the actual economic solvency risk? In our view, managers are 
likely to once again begin managing the regulatory solvency risk. Applying 
different interest rates (i.e. valuations) for the same cash flows depending on 
whether they show up on the asset or liability side of the balance sheet is tech-
nically challenging, since adopting UFR does not mean that economic risk 
disappears.
In our view, an insurance company or pension fund will do best by fully hedg-
ing the economic risk; in addition to this neutral position, management can have 
an active view on the expected development of interest rates. In other words, hav-
ing an active view on interest rates is a management decision and can be evaluated 
as such, rather than disguised as an asset liability management decision (or implic-
itly supported by a regulatory framework).
Precedent-setting Concerns
As noted above, some effort was devoted to save weaker local insurers and pension 
funds in the wake of the financial crisis. This is understandable, since the early 
adopters implemented stricter local solvency regulations compared to the current 
E.U. directive. And it would have been difficult for politicians to explain why they 
closed down one of their own insurers or pension funds due to insolvency, while 
others with similar (or worse) financial situations could have continued to operate 
just because they were regulated by a different E.U. member state which applied 
the minimum requirements under the current regulatory framework. Yet saving 
one local company creates a precedent, giving pensions and insurers mixed sig-
nals that could stimulate moral hazard; additionally, large local players may seek 
to game the regulatory framework.
European pension and insurer regulation is being driven by the European 
Commission and EIOPA, the European supervisor for pension funds and insur-
ance companies. While these entities seek to create a single market by bring-
ing in stricter regulation, there is much lobbying underway in Brussels seeking 
to weaken the capital requirements under the proposed regulatory frameworks. 
Indeed, introducing the UFR methodology into Solvency II and IORP II may be 
one of the lobby’s most important achievements.
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Conclusion
Retirees seek stable retirement incomes, and traditional DB pension schemes met 
this goal by offering real deferred annuities to their members. Yet the traditional 
DB design proved to be unsustainable due to demographic and financial market 
developments. Nevertheless, DB plans serve as a guide for what a good pension 
system should provide to participants, namely lifelong and stable inflation-linked 
cash flows throughout retirement. This objective translates into a risk-free invest-
ment for the consumer or a portfolio that matches retirement spending needs. 
From this viewpoint, risk refers to not being able to achieve this stable income. 
Naturally this perspective on risk differs from the wealth management portfolio, 
where risk is typically measured as asset volatility in relation to cash.
The E.U. regulatory changes reviewed here are intended to create a single mar-
ket for retirement provision across the region. If  successful, the reforms will remove 
an obstacle to labor mobility in the E.U. and create a single European market for 
pension provision. The proposed regulatory frameworks are based on market valu-
ation of  liabilities, and they aim to close the gap between regulatory and economic 
solvency measures. This will increase transparency and create incentives for insur-
ers and pension funds to manage the balance sheet risks in an economically mean-
ingful way. It also provides the regulator with an early warning system and tools for 
intervention. Moreover, as the barriers between traditional DB and DC plans are 
becoming less relevant, regulation is keeping up: for instance, pension plans will be 
identified as individual or collective DC plans, with or without guarantees, and as 
trust- or contract-based. For this reason, the natural barriers are melting between 
regulation covering pensions (IORP), insurers (Solvency), and banks (Basel). In the 
longer run, the different regulatory frameworks (Solvency, IORP, and Basel) will 
also converge, but since it is a political process, it is difficult to say much about the 
timetable or path to that end.
Although the E.U. faces many unique challenges, some lessons can be drawn. 
Moving to a risk-based regulatory framework where both assets and liabilities 
are valued according to mark-to-market principles increases transparency. 
Putting a fair price on guarantees acknowledges the market value of  cash flows, 
rather than concealing problems with book values based on wishful think-
ing. Policymakers outside the E.U. contemplating new regulations based on 
economic solvency measures will want to carefully consider the timing of  the 
implementation and the transition rules. Ideally, it would be useful to implement 
new frameworks in robust economic periods when interest rates are closer to 
long-term averages. Regarding enforcement, a valuable lesson can be learned 
from the early adopters of  the new E.U. regulatory framework. Regulatory 
enforcement must be credible and the prompt corrective actions have to be 
strong. If  the industry does not consider regulators to be credible, business will 
continue as usual and business models will not be adapted to the new regulatory 
framework. The global financial crisis showed that it was too difficult for early 
adopters to enforce their local regulatory framework, so they relaxed regulations 
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to avoid having insurers become insolvent. This response has set precedents, 
and the industry is most likely to try to game the regulators in the future by play-
ing the ‘too big to fail’ card.
The E.U. regulatory developments also offer useful insights for those seek-
ing to improve the pension product. Collective self-annuitizing schemes can be 
useful, but these must be transparent and internal fairness issues resolved. If not, 
contract-based individual solutions will dominate pension provision, which could 
be a loss from the consumer perspective. A leading design principle is that risks 
which cannot be hedged in the market or naturally reduced by risk pooling in 
the collective should be passed back to the individual. The proposed E.U. regula-
tion illustrates that there is a way to implement an internal risk-based account-
ing framework that will increase the transparency and fairness across cohorts. 
Another lesson learned for product design is that by applying the principles of 
market-consistent valuation and pricing mechanisms, one can construct a collec-
tive product that is fair to members/customers and offers promise with respect to 
looming risk-based regulatory frameworks.
Notes
 1. Pensions are high on the policy agenda because most member states are confronting 
enormous challenges in the Pillar I systems as Baby Boomers enter retirement. Often 
public pensions are pay-as-you-go systems paid directly from government budgets. 
While this mode worked reasonably well given a growing workforce, it has come 
under challenge given population aging, forcing many countries to implement reforms 
boosting the retirement age to 67. In the Netherlands, the proposed transition period is 
eight years; in the United Kingdom it is 13 years, and in Germany the process will take 
17 years. One exception to this trend is France, where some have proposed lowering 
the minimum retirement age from 62 to 60; nevertheless, the age to receive a full pub-
lic pension in France went up from 65 to 68. In addition to the increasing first-pillar 
pension payments, many governments also have unfunded DB occupation pensions 
for civil servants on their economic balance sheets.
 2. Basel III standards were agreed on in 2010–11 but implementation in the banking 
arena has been delayed until 2019 (Financial Times 2012).
 3. See the Human Mortality Database (2013): <http://www.mortality.org/>.
 4. Trampusch et al. (2010) provides a comprehensive overview of the pension reforms in 
the Swedish system.
 5. €33,363. Exchange rate EUR:US$ 1.3043 ( July 1, 2013)
 6. 79.31 GBP. Exchange rate GBP:US$ 1.5232 ( July 1, 2013)
 7. 18 to 33 GBP. Exchange rate GBP:US$ 1.5232 ( July 1, 2013)
 8. 144 GBP. Exchange rate GBP:US$ 1.5232 ( July 1, 2013)
 9. See Diamond (1977), Gordon and Varian (1988), and Ball and Mankiw (2007), among 
others.
 10. There might be still some unfair distribution among the generations inside the pension 
fund; see Lever et al. (2012).
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 11. According to the CBS (2013) life expectancy after retirement (age 65) increased by 
1.11 years for men and 0.49 years for women between 2007 and 2013. On average, life 
expectancy after retirement increased by 0.8 years for this period.
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